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COMMENTAIRES 
BROADCASTING LABOUR RELATIONS 
Bernard Brody 
This paper x began as a typical book review of an essentially académie 
study of the labour relations System in Canada's broadcast industry, Once 
under way, however, it became rapidly apparent the endevour would go 
far beyond the traditional limits of the task 2. Among the events analyzed 
will be a detailed view from within, a personal perception of the 1959 
CBC-TV producer's strike. 
Ruby Samlalsingh's Broadcasting -An Industry Study 3, is a highly 
compétent pièce of research on one of the most dynamic and controversial 
sectors of the Canadian labour scène of the 1960's. The author has made 
very fruitful use of the now-classical, Dunlop 4 model with its well-known 
« contexts » « web-of-rules », « actors », «Outputs » and « Inputs ». 
One of the major drawbacks of the book, acknowledged by the author 
in her Préface, is that several key issues were on the verge of seulement 
as the study cut-off was made. 
Among others, the IATSE/SGCT/ 
CUPE rivalry was in full bloom 
BRODY, B., Assistant-Professeur, Dé-
partement des relations industrielles, 
Université de Montréal. 
* BRODY, B., Assistant-Professeur, Département des relations industrielles, Uni-
versité de Montréal. 
i The following abbreviations are used : IATSE, International Alliance of 
Theatrieal and Stage Employées ; NABET, National Association of Broadcast 
Employés and Technicians ; ARTEC, Association of Radio and Télévision Em-
ployées of Canada; SGCT, Le Syndicat Général du Cinéma et de la Télévision; 
CUPE, Canadian Union of Public Employées. 
2
 The reviewer, currently assistant professor, Industrial Relations Départaient, 
Université de Montréal, spent twelve years (1954-1965) at the CBC-TV Montréal. 
He was personally very involved in two of the main events described in the book 
under review : the 1959 TV-producers' strike and the 1964 IATSE fiasco. He 
was a TV audio engineer and NABET shop steward from 1954 to 1958 and a 
TV coordinating producer and IATSE chief steward between 1959 and 1965. He 
was also founder-president of the Montréal Radio and TV Employées; Crédit 
Union in 1955. 
3 Prime Minister's Task Force on Labour Relations, Study No. 1, Ottawa, 
1970. 
4 Dunlop, J., Industrial Relations Systems, New York, Holt, 1958. 
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and the transformation of the Board of Broadcast governers into the 
Canadian Radio and Télévision Commission was yet to corne. 
THE ECONOMIC ENVIRONNEMENT 5 
In the section on the economic context, the author is overly restrictive 
in the concept of the demand for airtime (the « product » or « output »). 
The purely commercial announcements (30 secs., 60 secs.) appears us 
the product demanded by advertisers. This approach reveals two weak 
assumptions : 
1 — that there is no demand for non-sponsored programs and 
2 — that program sponsors buy only the restricted, half-minute a full-
minute of the actual product announcement. 
The first point needs no further élaboration except to say that the CBC 
would certainly continue in opération if commercials were prohibited. 
Even without « commercials », the broadcast industry would still hâve 
important economic significance. On the second point, the advertiser who 
sponsors a program « buys » the entire half-hour or full-hour, and discri-
minâtes as to the type of program (content and time of broadcast) he 
wants to « vehicle » his product. Even purchasers of « spots » 6 are very 
sélective not only as to which programs précède and succeed their announ-
cements, but also the type of products advertised in the same station 
break. One gets the impression that the advertisor is only interested in 
the number of viewers watching his program (spot) in abstraction of the 
program content. In fact, the sponsor buys the whole program and is very 
concerned with the viewers' démographie qualities, as well as the purely 
quantitative (« costs per 1,000 ») dimension. 
The author admits that the serious parcity of data on the private 
half of the industry placed severe limitations on her ability to give anything 
but the scantiest attention to this sector. This must constitute a serious 
shorteoming of the book since the private stations occupy half of the 
industry, and in terms of revenues, are growing at a more rapid rate 
than the CBC. It should also be pointed out that there is a marked 
tendency towards greater concentration of ownership as a few strong 
corporations procède to buy up stations. This trend will doubtless shape 
the future character of both commercial content and policy as well as 
program quality in this most potent of communications média. 
We read (P. 12) « As far as the public is concerned there is no 
direct cost for this . . . (TV) . . . service ». While this is technically a true 
statement7, it could be misleading. The public does bear some proportions 
5 The sub-titles are those used by the author. 
6 « Spots » are commercials which usually appear between programs, in the 
station breaks. 
7
 Subscribers to cable-TV do hâve a direct cost 
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of both program and commercial costs either in the form of taxes (Le., 
CBC subsidies, now in the order of one million dollars per year) or 
for the latter, as a portion of the purchase price of the product. Though 
« . . . the cost is paid by firms » (P. 12), in the final analysis, this cost 
is shared by firms and consumer s 8. 
The modem economist will also want to add to costs the value of 
alternate use of time spent watching commercials and programs. This 
factor constitutes a real cost in tenus of the allocation (expenditure) of 
a very scarce resource. 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
The author makes several statements of opinion which really should 
hâve been footnoted as to source. « The private stations are reputed 
to be strongly against union act ivi ty . . .» (P. 28). « . . . the CBC is 
reputed to hâve fought the union by threats of dismissal and demotion » 
(P. 35). The reviewer fully shares thèse opinions, and Miss SamMsingh 
is to be commended on her research hère too. Indeed the entire section 
on the actors (unions) is exceptionally well done and reveals her extensive 
ability. The cogent and accurate coverage goes well beyond mère des-
cription. 
However, the addition of a new term « vertical unit > (P. 36 et seq) 
to describe an « industriel unit » is unnecessary and even misleading. The 
unit discussed - production employées - is in fact « horizontal », the 
constituents being, in terms of the organizational hierarchy, on the 
same level, not on différent levels. 
On the following page (p. 37) the author offers this reviewer a 
splendid opportunity to comment on a widely-held myth in industrial 
relations. Some feel that we can eliminate ail the work-jurisdictional 
frictions and inefficiencies by simply lumping the various trades (on a 
job site) into a single unit for purposes of collective bargaining. « The 
CBC wanted floor managers and stagehands included in the NABET 
unit in order that ail employées working on stage should belong to the 
same union. This would hâve eliminated jurisdictional disputes during 
rehersals and avoided the clumsy arrangement whereby the CBC producer 
of ten has members of five différent unions working together on stage ». 
In the course of a typical program, there are only two 9 unions with 
members on the floor: NABET (technicians) and IATSE (produc-
tion) 10. One wonders, in view of this, why there « too many unions » ? 
8
 The apportioning of the advertising cost burden dépends on the price elas-
ticity of demand of the advertised product. The greater this elasticity, the higher 
the proportion of advertising costs borne by firms and vice versa. 
9
 This excludes actors and musicians whom the CBC could not possibly (for 
historical reasons) hâve lumped together in a single union anyway. 
10
 At the time the book was written, the CUPE members were represented by 
IATSE. 
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The real locus of the problem lies at the level of job classification within 
unions, even within a single bargaining unit ! The « jurisdictional dis-
putes » alluded to in the quote really occur between, for example, the 
floor manager (IATSE) and stagehand (also IATSE), or between différ-
ent types of stagehands, or between a stagehand and a decorator (IATSE), 
ail in the same unit ! The IATSE unit in Montréal contained no less than 
49 job titles ! Each of thèse « trades » had a written job description and 
each group was, understandably, extremely sensitive to others trespassing 
on its job duties. This is simple Perlmanian « job consciousness » n . You 
protect your existing and future jurisdictions (job duties) and you assure 
the continued existence of your job. When a member of one trade tres-
passes on another's jurisdiction, the latter reacts as violently as if the 
attack it had been made by someone from a différent unit or a différent 
union ! One filed a grievance irrespective of whether the violation came 
from a « brother » or not. 
The attitude and reaction described above cardes an important lesson 
for those seeking to bring order to the chaotic industrial relations in the 
beleagered construction industry 12. The solutions to inefficiency and inter-
union strife seem ail to be directed at enlarging the bargaining unit. While 
this may appear to be the reasonable line of attack, our analysis of the 
TV stage seems to suggest that the real answer lies elsewhere. Occupants 
of each job classification are gardians of their collection of duties and 
will, in self-defence, react fiercely to any attempt to erode those duties. 
The situation is not entirely unlike the behaviour of oligopolists as des-
cribed in intermediate microeconomic texts. Each member wants the 
industry (unit, union) to grow but also wants at least to maintain his 
market share (i.e. job). The lesson derived from this digression is that 
only restructuring the work processes themselves and by, in the case of 
construction the trades, can we hope to reduce jurisdictional tensions 
substantially 13. To be sure, it is no simple matter to restructure the job 
tasks (acts). But the remedy for the frictions does appear to lie in 
making tasks broader and more flexible 14. 
Directing policy at the unit and union levels reminds one of the 
naïve approach to reducing labour-management conflict as expressed 
il Selig Perlman, A Theory of the Labour Movement, MacMillan, 1928. 
12 Symptomatic of growing concern are the Goldenberg-Crispo Ontario Royal 
Commission, the récent Québec laws, the Woods Committee in Nova Scotia, the 
Saskatchewan and Alberta expériences. 
13
 It is true that by marging « units » or « unions », jurisdictional frictions at 
thèse levels may recède (though there may still be « cliques » within the enlarged 
arrangements). The really fondamental problems is the job jurisdiction and no 
agrandisement of the units or unions will solve this problem. 
14 William Gomberg believes that thèse work rules are no more inefficient 
that other arrangements which are socially accepted. See his intreging, «Feather 
bedding : An assertion of Property Rights », in M. Wortman, Critical Issues in 
Labor, MacMillan, N. Y., 1969. 
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by the (growing) group of Industrial Relations Astroligers. To eliininate 
industrial conflict you simply pass laws outlawing strikes. Thèse « experts > 
act as though strikes were the only costly expression of worker discontent 
as that wildcat strikes did not exist. You do not cure visible cancer sores 
with iodine and band aids ! 
While in the area of the CBC unions, there is an incident that oc-
curred within IATSE which should be written into the record. At a 
meeting of local 878 stewards in 1963, it was decided that, since 98% 
of the 600 members were French-speaking, quarterly membership cards 
should be in the French language. When the next batch of cards came in 
from New York, thèse were returned with an appropriate explanatory 
note. Some time later the same cards arrived without explanatiort. Our 
business agent, Yvon Dansereau, communicated again with the head 
office, asking that the « French Fact » be respected. He was summarily 
advised that cards were always printed in English and that there was no 
possibility for change. A further suggestion that, for convenience, cards 
be printed hère with the bill sent to headquarters fell on deaf ears. One 
wonders if the new CUPE unit has acceded.. . 
The section on IATSE (p. 41 sq.) must really be brought up to 
date even if only in the briefest of terms. CUPE was finally able to replace 
IATSE and by successfully defeating the SGCT (CNTU) attempts to 
split the 1600 members national unit. It seems, however, that those 
Montréal members of the unit who still retain their links with the SGCT 
hâve not given up their fight for a separate Québec unit15. Though this 
reviewer's own feelings in this area are now well documented 16 a further 
comment might be in order hère. One questions the wisdom of the position 
taken by the CLC executive in maintaining, beyond ail common sensé, 
the « jurisdictional monopoly » principle. Their lack of courage and 
foresight, their imposition of the IATSE union on an unwilling member-
ship for so long created a great deal of unnecessary animosity not only 
towards the CLC, but indeed towards the very idea of unionism itself. 
There was, for example, the callous treatment given to the short-lived, but 
grass roots supported, Canadian Télévision Union 17. 
It might hâve been useful to hâve mentioned that the clérical union, 
ARTEC, grew out of the paternalistic « staff councils » and was regarded 
by other unionists as something only slightly more than a « company 
union ». Aside from its pedigree, ARTEC was the only union without 
!5 Based on conversations with those involved, January 1971. 
!6 See B. Brody chapter : « The Bargaining Unit for Québec », in E.E. Herman, 
The Size and Composition of the Bargaining Unit, Task Force on Labour Relations, 
Ottawa, 1969. 
17 The CTU lost its 1965 bid for certification when the Canada Labour Rela-
tions Board (CLRB) rejected an application on what really amounted to a techni-
cality. 
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CIC affiliation. Also, its character is revealed in its lack of solidarity with 
fellow-unions and failure to hold out for more than two weeks during the 
1959 producers' strike 18. 
As pointed out at the outset of this review, Miss Samlalsingh's study 
terminâtes at an unfortunate time. Subsequently, the efforts to fraction-
alize the IATSE national unit created what is undoubtly the most heated 
controversy in the history of the CLRB 19. The CNTU did indeed with-
draw ail its représentatives from ail fédéral bodies. Only when the govern-
ment presented Bill C-18620 late in 1967 did this federation's relation-
ship with the government return to normal. 
Bill C-186 was to hâve amended the IRDIA in three important 
ways : 
1 — The single CLRB would sit in several régional divisions. This 
would hâve removed it (at least partially) from its secluded Ot-
tawa ivory tower and brought it closer to where the action is, 
into the mosaic of rapidly changing social realities within this 
diverse nation of ours. Members would obtain a more realistic 
«feel» for régional diversity and thus be better able to respond 
in a more cohérent and positive way. 
2 — The new law would state explicitly that the board could take into 
account régional peculiarities as a criterion for determining if a 
proposed unit is appropriate. The IRDIA does not of course 
address itself at ail to this question 21. it was the board's own exten-
sive jurisprudence favouring national units and its almost fanatical 
réticence to split an existing national unit that blinded it from 
seeing the obvious régional forces for change. 
3— An appeal procédure was to be established when the board refused 
a régional unit. This was the weak substitute for a spécifie change 
demanded by the CNTU 22. 
In cases where there was a jurisdictional dispute involving a CNTU 
union and a CLC affiliate, the board, as presently constituted, can hardly 
tender équitable justice. Of the four employée représentatives on the 
board, three hâve CLC affiliations, only one is nominated by the CNTU ! 
The defunct Québec Labour Relations Board used the formula of divesting 
18 Some of the issues surrounding the strike are discussed below. 
19
 See B. Brody in E.E. Herman, op. cit. 
20 See CNTU, Mémorandum to the Fédéral ^Cabinet, February 16, 1966, esp. 
pp. 26-27 for this federation's proposais for « urgent amendments » to the IRDIA 
(the fédéral labour act). 
21 The IRDIA only asks that the unit be «appropriate for collective bar-
gaining ». Article 8 does indicate some a priori appropriateness for « a craft or 
group exercising technical skills». 
22 See footnote 19. 
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ail members — except the chairman — of voting rights23. One takes 
serious issue with Miss Samlalsingh when she state (P. 52) « . . . the dis-
parity in the size of the two labour organizations . . . (CLC, CNTU) . . . 
would justify greater représentation of the CLC ». While this quantitative 
justice applies to ail other matters handled by the board, it could not 
be seriously sustained in cases conoerning inter-federation jurisdictional 
disputes. An important principle of démocratie justice is that one cannot 
be both party and judge in the same case. It should be noted that the 
CLRB did indeed split a national unit at the CBC shortly after the tre-
mendous uproar it created in the event described in the previous para-
graph. It decided to grant a Québec, carved-out unit to the SGCT from 
within the national CWSG. One of the board's criteria for « appropriat-
ness > in this case was the discernable language and cultural identity of 
the CBC-Newsroom employées in Montréal, Québec City and Chicoutimi. 
This is essentially the same argument (among other s) used when SGCT 
applied for, and was categorically refused a certificate for the Québec 
IATSE members24. 
A single (to this reviewer's knowledge) adverse incident did arise 
from the split when the Toronto TV newsroom temporarily refused access 
to a Montreal-based reporter, member of the break-away group. 
The CLRB « no-fractionalizing » rule was obviously an over-worked, 
archaic doctrine. It was maintained and imposed mainly because it cons-
tituted a comfortable bit of dogma and relieved the tired board members 
of the need to engage in the necessary intellectual and practical exercise 
of dealing with the new realities of the new Canada. I remain convinced 
that even though the ex-IATSE case is now « closed » 25, the CUPE 
national unit solution is not a final answer. 
There is nothing either in law or in jurisprudence obliging the board 
to judge as to the relative appropriateness of two possible units. It is not 
required to look to the « most appropriate > one. Perhaps the « most 
appropriate unit » is one composed of ail the unionizable employées in 
23
 See CRT, Amalgamated Lithographers, loc. 27, vs. Montréal Printing 
Pressmen, loc. 52 et Montréal Typographical Union, loc. 176 and Mercury Press ; 
August 22, 1966. 
24 in the Brody chapter (E.E. Herman, op. cit.), it was argued that the cultural 
identity, butressed by the strong will expressed by the workers involved should 
been sufficient for a Québec unit to qualify as « appropriate >. There was and 
still is almost no mobility (transfers, etc.), between the members involved in Que-
bec and those in rest of Canada. Surely this is an important constituent of « com-
munity of interests >, the principle on which « appropriateness » rests. The incon-
veniences » to management remains a second order objection. 
25 Very récent (January 1971) conversations with both, CBC management and 
various union représentatives indicate that the régional tensions hâve still not 
subsided significantly. 
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the Québec division. With a carefully laid out structure which guarantees 
autonomy to the various classes of workers (approximately équivalent 
to the existing unions) the split would best serve the interests of both the 
CBC administration and the union members. An alternative suggestion 
would be coalition bargaining by existing unions, but for the Québec 
division separately. Surely this réduction in the national sweep would 
allow collective bargaining to cope much better not only with économie 
issues (being based on the économie realities of the région) but also with 
those very important spécifie political and cultural realities. It is perfectly 
naïve to prétend that one can compartmentalize thèse political and cultural 
forces out of the économies and sociology of the work place. 
THE OUTPUTS OF THE SYSTEM 
Under the subtitle « Institutionally Oriented Outputs » (p. 71) one 
is surprised to find the discussion limited to the unions and their members. 
Surely the corporation is as much an « institution », and surely « manage-
ments rights », problems of dealing with so many unions and régions, etc. 
constitute appropriate and important outputs. 
The relative wage in broadeasting is ascertained by comparing it 
to that of manufacturing (p. 73), and the former shows a favourable 
differential. This exercise reveals the bias of using « averages ». Would it 
be of any significance to learn that, at the time of the producers' strike 
there were full-time adult employées in the IATSE unit union with gross 
weekly wages of $44.04 ? 26 
Another output, technological change, is dealt with summarily. The 
repercussions of technical change in broadeasting hâve become even more 
dynamic since the publication of the book. As this review is being written 
there are sweeping spatial consolidations taking place both in Montréal 
and Toronto. The multi-million dollar Montréal complex covers several 
city blocks in the eastern part of the city. The new quarters will the most 
up to date anywhere and new equipment will render many existing skills 
(especially technical skills) obsolète. There will be labour-reducing inno-
vations on the production side and for operator-technicians (e.g. caméra 
controls, master controls, téléciné-projectionists). Some of the latter are 
now being retrained as maintenance technicians to meet the increased 
need of this skill. Master control will be wholly computerized, with the 
entire day's station breaks and cut-ins programmed onto magnetic tape 
each morning. 
It will be interesting to observe the way ail concerned ajust to résolve 
the inévitable tensions and conflicts that accompany so rapid and extensive 
a change in the work situation. 
26 CBC/IATSE, Collective agreement, 1959, p. 32. 
444 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 2 7 , NO 3 
THE TALENT UNIONS 
Miss Samlalsingh was surely carried away when she wrote (P. 82) 
« By sheer weight of their organized strength they. . . (the CBC-TV 
producers) . . . hâve been able since 1959 to force voluntary récognition 
by the employer ». Thèse 74 producers had, it must be remembered, 
the full-force backing of 180027 fellow workers as well the CNTU, 
the QFL, the artists and the authors ! Without the voluntary support -
at very great personal sacrifice28 - of thèse 1800, the producers would 
still be picketing outside the Dorchester CBC headquarters today ! 
The type of « agreements » reached by the CBC and its talent 
unions, AFM and ACTRA29, takes us back into the history of wage 
theory. Thèse unions bargained not only for a wage rate, but also for 
a guarantee of a certain proportion of the company's total expenditives : 
a « wage bill ». For the musicians, this was 35% of total talent fées, for 
the actors it was that at least $15. million was to be spent on talent fées. 
Could this throw back to the defunct (?) « wages fund theory » offer 
any useful insights on how to solve some of the conflicts concerning job 
security and job guarantees ? Could we apply the wage bill concept to 
help find solutions to the ever-growing cases of mass lay offs currently 
buffeting the Québec economy ? 
There is also potential profit to be gained from a deeper examination 
of the CBC-ACTRÀ arrangement in providing a union steward for every 
show in which an ACTRA member performs. The steward's fee is shared 
equalilly by union and employer. This is one of the very problems that 
has kept the Québec construction industry in a state of termoil for the 
past year. Is a shared-cost plan the solution hère too ? 
THE PRODUCERS ASSOCIATIONS 
In this chapter on the controversial Montréal CBC-TV producers 
Association and their strike the author again reveals her outstanding 
ability in the research art. Most of the major events and much of the 
fine détail in faithfully described in her book. 
There are some matters, however, which it is virtually impossible 
to discover unless one has lived through them. It is the task of scientific 
27 Includes ARTEC, who went in after about two weeks. 
28 Some of the strikers lost homes, autos, health, marital stability. Many 
accumulated large debts. At an average weekly wage of $85.00, the staff support 
group lost a total income of over one million dollars ! The loss of the free-lance 
supporters — actors and authors — is difficult to estimate and is not included 
in this total. 
29 AFM, American Fédération of Musicians ; ACTRA, Association of Cana-
dian Radio and Télévision Artists. 
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research to seek causal relationships between events and variables. This 
is usually carried out in abstration, for example, of the décisive rôle 
often played the personalities involved ; personal friendships and personal 
antipathies. Many of us close to the 1959 producers' strike felt, for instance, 
that things might hâve developed differently had the then-Director of 
CBC-TV in Montréal not been the younger brother of the Président of 
the CBC. Again, could a researcher hâve discovered that the multitude 
of films used by the CBC to cover the 69 day strike were rented from 
the same individual who was shortly thereafter to be awarded the franchise 
for the private French TV outlet in Montréal, and that, almost to a man, 
the Montréal CBC-TV management staff (including its Montréal Director 
of TV) was to leave the Corporation and manage this new, rival station ? 
Based on producers' opinions, the author states (P. 93) that the 
major cause of the strike was that producers felt « . . . . their function had 
changed considerably since 1953 » by graduai removal of most of their 
«management duties ». She goes on to quote (P. 96), « we would be 
willing to give up any prétentions to management functions in order that 
our syndicat be recognized... ». Firstly, on the basis of this reviewer's 
expérience, the alleged significant removal of the producers management 
function is quite exaggerated. Though there was some érosion, it had 
not seriously hampered their ability to work property. 
In looking back from the vantage point of the past ten years, the 
main cause of the strike appears quite certain to this reviewer. Management 
had failed to develop the required level of administrative compétence 
that was necessary to cope with the rapid transition of the opérations hère 
from a cozy, paternalistic and intimate environment, into a vast and 
complex enterprise employing a thousand artists and scientific and tech-
nical specialists. The breakdown of personal, vertical relationships was 
generalized, profound and évident to ail. There was no confidence left 
in either direction ; up or down. Management had become sloppy and 
unprofessional in its dealings with producers. The contract renewal mess is 
typical of this gross incompétence. There was almost no job security 
for producers because so many individual contracts had run out. In 
retrospect then, this is a classic example of a firm outgrowing its owner's 
capacity to manage things. Had the opérations been based on profitability, 
the enterprise would hâve folded up before 1958. 
Secondly, I would seriously question the contention that the producers 
were willing to give up any significant management functions in exchange 
for whatever job security a collective agreement might bring. I base thas 
position on two arguments : 
1 — it is not really possible for a producer to be créative, i.e. exercise 
his art, if he cannot choose his own scripts, performers, musicians, 
decorators, rehersal length, etc. When, following the strike, the CBC 
interposed between the producers and his « cast » (against the will of 
the producers) the « unit administrator » 30 a new bureaucrat - the 
producer really lost control of his art form. To illustrate, say a produ-
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cer feels that, for the show he has in mind, the idéal singer is Miss 
Alpha. Miss Alpha asks $1,000. for her performance. The producer 
then submits this expense item to the unit administrator. The latter 
now has the power to refuse the request and to recommend Miss 
Beta, also a singer, who is ready to do the show for $750.00. It is 
thus obvious that the right to hire a performer of his taste is an 
important aspect of the producer's ability to create a show. To divest 
himself of this right in to emasculate his function. 
2 — A few years following récognition of their association, the producers 
lodged a formai complaint with the Board of Broadcast Governers 
stating that the Corporation had removed some important éléments 
of their management duties and it was therefore impossible for them 
to function properly. 
This apparent incompatibility of management responsibility with 
job security and unionism raises one of the most burning issues in 
contempory North American Industrial Relations : supervisory unionism. 
Supervisory employées ( « les cadres s> ) want to retain the prestige 
and power, but also want more job security31, a grievance procédure 
with ultimate third party adjudication. They want replacement of the 
authoritarian régime within the firm hierarchy by a more démocratie 
process. Can they hâve both ? Can top management find a way of introdu-
cing the basic tenents of industrial democracy into an establishment 
which has never denied its essentially undemocratic ideology ? Is it 
possible to reconcile absolute power, démocratie values, and job security ? 
Is top management prepared to accept the obligation of showing « just 
cause » for firing or accepting third party arbitration in disputes with 
lower and middle management staff ? This reviewer remains essentially 
optimistic on the capacity of existing organizational mores to adapt to 
the challange of what seems to be a growing feeling of the need for 
collective self-protection. The propensity to seek such protection by 
employées who hâve traditionally considered themselves secure (providing 
they did their jobs properly) will increase as organizational, technological 
and économie changes intensify. In the world of the 1970's ail indications 
point to an accélération of such changes. 
To date top management has reacted emotionally, and removed 
some discretionary power from supervisors. This tendency of moving 
the locus of effective power higher up in the organization is undesirable 
because it enlarges the distance between the décision - makers and those 
who live with the effects of décisions. Top management must learn to 
30 This administrator is a type of cost accountant or comptroller. 
31 Executive lay off and professional unemployment are becoming common ; 
viz., Air Canada in 1970, etc. See Financial Post, January 23, 1971, p. 1 : «Job 
Squeeze Hits Executive Suites . . . > 
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respond in a more rational way and with the best interests of the organiz-
ation as its criterion32. 
PRODUCER AFFILIATION 
There is one burning question which the book fails to answer or 
indeed to raise. Why was the CBC management so adament and inflexible 
in its absolute opposition to the affiliation of the producers' Association 
with the CNTU ? We are informed, in vivid terms, of the altérations 
in the wording of the terms of agreement ending the producers' strike 
and how the association moved away from outright affiliation to a much 
looser arrangement involving the supply of « technical services ». We are 
also told that disagreement on this subject kept the 1200 strikers out 
for an extra week. Why did the CBC hold up settlement and re-integration 
of the strikers on this seemingly technical and really marginal point? 
After ail, the other CBC unions possessed this freedom and were ail 
affiliated to a fédération, the CLC33. Could there hâve been a « conflict 
of interest » between « managed » and « managers » 34 belonging to the 
same fédération ? 
One would easily concède a high probability of conflict of interests 
where managers and managed share a single bargaining unit. This 
concession is slightly less forthcoming when there are two separate units 
within a single union, but hère too there is much room for potential 
conflict. However when the only source of possible conflict résides in 
the common affiliation to a fédération of two wholly independent unions, 
the opposition must be disgarded 35. 
Furthermore, it must be remembered that this was a case of voluntary 
récognition by a single employer. If it had been a request before a labour 
relations board for a certificate, formai considérations of the appropriate-
ness of the affiliation might hâve been more necessary because of the 
jurisprudence it might hâve created. 
In any case, there were no employée unions affiliated with the 
CNTU at that time anyway, so even this could not hâve been the real 
reason for CBC's opposition. What then was it ? We can only speculate. 
Was the arrangement singled out because it would hâve given the CNTU 
32 At Université de Montréal, a M.A. thesis is currently being directed by the 
reviewer on the effects of this type of unionization. 
33 Although ARTEC was unaffiliated to the CLC, it was in the stages of 
merger with NABET which was affiliated. 
34 See below for a fuller explanation of this « manager-managed > relationship. 
35 Shirley Goldenberg, in Professional Worker and Collective Bargaining, Task 
Force Study No. 2, 1970 holds that «while some prophets of doom déplore the 
possibility of union aff i l ia t ion. . . (for professional unions) . . . in my opinion this 
is not a major problem > (p. 99) . 
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a foothold among fédéral government employées ? Was the CLC mono-
poly at stake ? Did the government want to avoid the discomfort of inter-
federation rivalry ? Was the government afraid that the CNTU's millitancy 
would spread to the picnic-oriented associations which represented the 
civil servants ? 
Or was the CBC the subject of pressures from employers, through 
the cabinet, who did not want to create a présidence in the area of 
supervisory unionism in North America ? Only the CBC top management 
know the trne answer or the correct combination of those présente»! hère. 
On the subject of the extent and quality of the producer's managerial 
powers - a very critical issue indeed - Miss Samlalsingh is les s than 
fully correct. She writes (P. 101), «The solidarity of ail catégories of 
employées with the producers who exercise managerial control over them 
was remarkable » (ital. added). The facts are thèse: TV producers 
exercise managerial control only on the talent union members (actors, 
writers) who are ail free-lance thus not CBC « employées ». The 1200 
support strikers - 650 IATSE (production crews) 450 NABET (technical 
crews) and 50 CWSG (newsmen) - were ail CBC staff employées. The 
work relationship between a show producer and the crews is devoid of 
vertical managerial power. Each of the former catégories has a line super-
viser for every show who possesses thèse rights 36. Thus there is a chief 
accessory man, a technical producer, a newsroom supervisor. The producer 
asks for spécifie acts from crew members which are in harmony with 
his conception of the image content he wants to project on home TV 
screens. He has nothing to do with the management of the employées 
in the sensé that he goes not « . . . represent the employer in his clearings 
with the employées » 37. This is the essential but subtle distinction that 
must be made between someone who supervises the work of others and 
someone who supervises others. An organizational chart of the CBC 
hierarchy would not show any solid vertical Unes linking the blocks 
marked « TV Producer » and « TV Cameraman ». There would be such 
link between « Technical Producer » and « TV Cameraman ». There would 
be none between « TV Producer » and « Technical Producer ». 
The first part of the quotation, the « remarkable » support received 
by the producers is intriguing for a variety of reasons and it is of immense 
importance that other industrial relations researchers be made aware 
of the facts in this particular case. 
On the basis of his own twelve (12) years TV studio expérience, 
this reviewer contends that most of the 1200 supporters actually disliked 
36 Though this is not the place to enter a full discussion of what constitutes 
« managerial rights », the reviewer's opinion it that they center about the rights 
to hire, fine, discipline, merit rate and similar powers. 
37 This is an accepted meaning and a reason for excluding an individual from 
the définition of «employée» in the IRDIA, s2 (1) (i) (jj). 
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most of the producers. The producer's function is to create, and he thus 
exposes his tastes (or lack of them) when he asks tasks of the technical 
and production crews. Anyone with professional stage expérience knows 
the disdain with which most artists hold other artists. TV crew members 
constantly criticize producers for the alleged stupidities and maladroitness 
exhibited in their shows. Adding fuel to this perception is the existence 
of the unusually extensive practice of nepotism in the industry. « One 
day he was an insurance salesmen, the next day be began ordering us 
about the stage just because his uncle i s . . . ». 
Whether most of the producers were actually inept and lacked «taste » 
is of course irrelevant. What matters is that this is the way the crews 
perceived them. How then do we explain 38 the support, at great personal 
sacrifice, of the 1200? Miss Samlalsingh (P. 101) offers several ex-
planations ; ail falling, more a less, under the gênerai rubric : « Natio-
nalism » 39. They are : ( 1 ) rejection by English CBC locations of support 
for their French fellow unionists ; (2) rejection by the Anglophone Prime 
Minister and Labour Minister of requests to intervene and force the CBC 
management to settle ; (3) rejection of the merits in the case by the 
Montréal Anglophone press. 
To thèse, the reviewer adds : (4) Most Montréal CBC-TV workers 
felt a contempt towards the local management. This made for a feeling 
of solidarity when the producers decided to « stand up » against them. 
(5) Right from the start of the strike, ail supporters were subjected to 
what came to be known as « booster shots ». Thèse were weekly meetings 
and ralleys which were always highlited by outbursts of masterful oratorical 
gems by such well-known (and loved . . . ) figures as René Lévesque, 
Jean Marchand, Jean-Louis Roux, Louis Morriset, Jean Duceppe, etc, 
This was not a strike led by manual tradesmen. Thèse strike leaders were 
familiar French Canadian personalities, held in high esteem and supurbly 
gifted in their common art and source of livelihood : the technique of 
emotional séduction. (6) As stated above, the studio crews did not think 
too highly of most of the producers, yet they did support them. This 
seeming paradox requires a spécifie explanation beyond that supplied in 
this list thus far. To make this point understood, it is necessary to 
reconstruct the environment of a TV production studio with a show in 
progress. The production process itself calls for an extremely high degree 
of intégration and interdependence of personalities. It takes a sensé of 
belonging to a unified, single entity. There exists a certain, almost mystical 
bond among ail participants, in front of as well as behind the caméras. 
38 Thèse explanations will apply to pre-strike motivations as well as those 
manifestée! during the period the supporters were actually out. They seek to explain 
not only why they went out, but also why they held out. 
39
 On this barely pre-«quiet révolution» era, one is led to speculate on the 
character of this nationalism. It appears to hâve been of the older variety, almost 
« racism >, in the sensé that it was exclusively anti-English, rather than pro-French. 
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The « support paradox » should thus appear as something akin to 
the relationship between two neighbours who « hâte » one anotfaer. In 
a moment of crisis (a fire) however, the familiarity of closeness seems 
to corne to the surface and makes itself felt in support action. (7) The 
strikes were told repeatedly by some leaders that there would be no 
pay lost over the strike. The CBC was acting illegally and they would 
pay for the strike. Well known actors and personalities told us about 
the « secret talks », usually held « just a few minutes ago » with « an 
influencial member of parliament » who said that this was so. Under 
thèse ternis, the supporters reasoned, why not « take rime off » at the 
company's expense ? In the end the strikers were bitterly deceived (by 
their leaders ? by the M.P.'s ?) . The corporation was not strictly « illégal » 
and they paid nothing. To add insuit to injury the strikers were obliged 
to make up the missed payments on pension plans, etc. (8) There was 
a rather hazy « right » being defended « the right of association ». This 
slogan was repeated over and over again until it was imprinted on the 
strikers' brains. Almost no one ever bothered to explain what it meant, 
very few ever sought its meaning. It sounded like something sacred and 
inaliénable and thus was « worth fighting for . . . » . The reviewer recalls 
his own flamboyant outbursts during the démonstration in front of 
Ottawa's parliament buildings : « Give me liberty or give me death ». 
(9) The strike coincided with the Christmas holiday season. There were 
the usual parties help during the previous week and a quasi-carnival 
atmosphère prevailed. Why not just extend the holiday . . . especially for 
those who were scheduled to work . . . . (10) Even before the strike 
actually got under way (midnight, December 29, 1958) union leaders 
had convinced the workers that the CBC would not, could not let it 
happen. But even if they were so foolish as not to heed the producers' 
legitimate demands, the French network could not possibly hold out for 
more than a couple of days. The passing of the midnight deadline injected 
a dimension of stark reality into events . . . Before we knew it, and without 
any effort on our part, we were actually on strike. One had the feeling 
of floating without any links to anything solid . . . something like the 
first seconds of a parachutist's free float from out of the plane's fuselage... 
As the days wore on without any signs of weakening by management, 
the « extended holiday » took on a more somber colour. We began to 
miss our paychecks as the bills kept coming in 
There are three other aspects of the « remarkable relationship » 
which should hâve acted against the above list and perhaps even nullified 
the support of the 1200 for the 74. 
1 — Ail the existing unions at the CBC were CLC-affiliated 4°, the Pro-
ducers' Association was working with the rival CNTU. 
2 — Most of the producers had incomes approximately twice those of 
the average support group members. This reviewer, in the highest 
40 See footnote (31) re : ARTEC. 
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IATSE classification was earning less than $5,000. while a producer-
friend (with only two more years of service) received $12,000. 
3 — The Québec unemployment rate in October - November - December 
1958 was in the order of 10%. The possibility of finding a part 
time job during the strike 41 was remote. 
It is now incumbent upon the reviewer to explain why the 1200 
did risk so much. The simple (simplistic ?) explanation is that the sum 
of the cohesive, centripetal forces of the first list (1-10) exceeded the 
sum of the divisive centrifugal forces of the second list (1-3). 
OTHER ISSUES 
The author states (P. 106) « . . . (the producers) . . . got a collective 
agreement covering gênerai working conditions and setting basic scales, 
and in addition gained the privilège of negotiating individual contacts 
for rates of pay over and above the collectively agreed scale . . . ». « This 
is an usual combination of employment arrangements . . . ». (ital. added). 
But surely this is not an « unusual » arrangement. I hâve never 
seen a collective agreement where salary scales were anything but mînima. ! 
Would any union ever handicap its members by imposing maxima? 
Would any employer limit his ability to retain and recruit individuals 
who command above-scale wages ? Ail a union really wants is to ensure 
that there is no undercutting : downward inflexibility. Some introductory 
labor économies texts give this erroneous impression : that unions hinder 
members' personal wage opportunities by setting out inflexible wage 
scales. Nothing prohibits the employer from granting above-scale rates. 
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 
I must also take serious issue with Miss Samlalsingh's statement 
(P. 106) : « Is there a case for enlarging the scope of the law to cover 
thèse excluded catégories . . . (lower level management ?) . . . or should the 
existing structure be maintained so that only the bold and fearîess may 
wrest the benefits of bargaining through the strengh of thier collective 
action ». The author is overly-generous in her évaluation of the sources 
of power in this case. I must again correct the impression one gets from 
the book about the « Batman » - type « hero power » of the 74 producers. 
The bulk of the power came from the 1200 support army. Of the dozen 
or so recognized strike leaders, the reviewer can think of only one 
producer. Miss Samlalsingh réitérâtes this myth again on P. 110 « . . . by 
sheer force of their . . . (the producers) . . . organized strength ». 
We now turn to the question of freedom of association and the 
exclusion of supervisory employées from the IRDIA. Among others, the 
41 Economists look to the unemployment rate as one of déterminants of the 
propensity to strike. In this case the factors in the first list were so pervasive that 
the « alternative employment principle — probability of supplementing lost income 
— was for ail practical purposes, totally irrelevent 
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Québec Labour Code, the Civil Service Act and the Fédéral Public 
Service Staff Relations Act do not exclude thèse classifications. I do not 
believe it équitable to withhold the right of association from any group 
of employées. It should be available to ail, the implementation of that 
right would dépend upon and be the primary concern to those directly 
involved. The Woods Task Force42 states that the exclusion of super-
visory and junior management employées is unjust and recommends that 
access to collective bargaining be permitted to them. The (overdue) 
new Fédéral labour statute should recognize the new realities of the 
sociology of the firm and also reflect the changes in social values since 
1948. 
No group of workers should be forced to make the kinds of sacrifices 
made by the CBC strikers in order to forge new laws. Let us hope that, 
by 1971, we hâve learned to minimize the cost of achieving social justice. 
The fundamentally masochistic and perverse value that is somehow 
« good » or « just » for one to suffer in order to hâve his rights recognized 
must surely be relegated to the garbage dump of history. Laws should be, 
though unfortunately rarely are, forward-looking. Lawmakers should be, 
though unfortunately rarely are, able to see ahead and estimate the kinds of 
laws best suited to regulate affairs among citizens (and between citizens 
and the state). 
PRODUCERS AS « PROFESSIONALS » 
Miss Samlalsingh states (P. 113), « The real . . . (strike) . . . issue 
was the criteria for defining the management function. The matter of 
their . . . (the producers) . . . professional status was never in question. 
Under the Act, producers would hâve been excluded from Union affiliation 
on both thèse scores ». The last statement is surely erroneous. Producers 
do not qualify as « professionals » under IRDIA 2(1) (i) (ii) any more 
than do economists, archeologists, chemists or university professors. They 
hâve no corporation with authority delegated by the state for régulation 
of the affairs of their profession. Even using the much broader sociological 
définition of a « professional », TV producers do not fit in43 . 
E T CETERA 
One of the main shortcomings of the book is its very summary 
treatment of one half of the Broadcast industry : its private sector. This 
42 Op. cit, p. 139. 
43
 See H. L. Wilensky, « The Professionalization of Everyone ? » American 
Journal of Sociology, September 64, pp. 137-58; and G. Strauss, « Professionalism 
and Occupational Associations», Industrial Relations, May 1963, pp. 7-31 ; and S.B. 
Goldenberg's, Professional Workers and Collective Bargaining, Task Force study 
# 2, chapters one and four offer a very compétent discussion on the meaning of 
« Professionalism », the location of the professional within the firm, and profes-
sional collective bargaining expérience. 
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is especially true of labour relations there. Granted that data is difficult 
to corne by some theoritical issues could hâve been explored. Why is 
unionization low among private station employées ? Turn-over rates 
are very high, units are small, ownership changes hands frequently. Why 
high turnover rates ? Newcomers, both on the announcer side as well as 
in engineering (opérations) often use a low paying private station job 
as a stepping-stone to the CBC or to the USA. There are a large proportion 
of « transients ». An analysis of CBC-employee work historiés will reveal 
this strong flow from the private stations. Because of the nature of the 
work (and the résultant nature of the employée) a dissatisfied private 
station employée chooses to change jobs rather than stick it out and 
unionize to ameliorate conditions. The stations with unions are invariably 
the larger ones where employées look to long run careers and so hâve 
a stake in the type of working conditions that evolve and prevail. If the 
cabinet deems that it is in the public interest to improve working con-
ditions u then there exists a mechanism with which to bring this about. 
The Québec Collective Agreements Act provides for « juridical extension > 
of a single collective agreement to an entire industry or to an entire région. 
It would thus be unnecessary to obtain bargaining certificates for each 
station (a very highly unlikely situation), and the extended conditions 
become légal minima for the employées concernée!. 
Name errors are analytically insignificant, but can be irritating. So 
we read « Canadian National Trade Union » (P. 46) and « Canadian 
National Trades Union » (P. 32) for the « Confédération of National 
Trade Unions », Canada's GNP cornes out as $176 billion (P. 16) 
when it should hâve been $76 billion(?). Several références to IATSE 
local 874 are made. The Montréal local of IATSE operating at the CBC 
was local 878. On page 6, we read that béer advertising on TV is pro-
hibited in Canada. Since when does Molsons make lemonade? 
History will be grateful to Miss Samlalsingh for her excellent contri-
bution to a better understanding of industrial relations in gênerai and 
in this spectacular industry in particular. Broadcasting -An Industry 
Study joins two existing works on the era and events : Jean Louis 
Roux's, « Radio Canada », chapter in En grève45 and the reviewer's own 
chapter in Herman's bargaining unit study for the Woods Task Force 
(see footnote 15). The reviewer hopes that his présent effort also fills 
in some of the gaps in the story. 
44 Station owners know that most job candidates are looking to move on 
elsewhere and therefore offer low salaries and long hours. The reviewer is aware 
of one station where announcers receive no salary at ail ! Compensation is limited 
to « expérience ». 
45
 En grève, Éditions du Jour, 1964. 
